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Abstract 
We study the relationship between market efficiency and the distribution of private information in 
experimental financial asset markets. Traders receive imperfect signals over the real value of an asset. 
Agents can share their information within a relatively small – compared to market size - group of 
agents. Both the number of signals and the way these are allocated among agents are manipulated in 
four experimental treatments. In two treatments signals are evenly distributed among agents. In two 
other treatments one group of ‘quasi-insider’ agents receives more signals than all other groups. In the 
baseline condition no signal is distributed. We show that centralizing information unambiguously 
achieves higher market efficiency than spreading information evenly. Furthermore, increasing the 
amount of information has no effect on efficiency either when information is symmetric or when it is 
asymmetric. We argue that two complementary mechanisms drive these results. First, having more 
private information ex ante induces traders to rely on their own signals, reducing the expected benefits 
of sharing information. Second, the presence of quasi-insider being common knowledge prompts 
agents to extract more information from market prices rather than their own private signals. This leads 
to swift information aggregation. 
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Introduction 
The capacity of markets to efficiently aggregate privately dispersed information has 
been a central topic in economics since Adam Smith and von Hayek. In the context of 
financial markets, Fama (1965) defines a market as efficient whenever prices "fully 
reveal" the information dispersed in the market. Intuitively, efficiency can be achieved 
because traders owning private information on the real value of an asset – so-called 
“insiders” - will seek to profit whenever prices do not fully embody their own private 
information. If markets are efficient, insiders’ private information is in the long run 
worthless and insiders cannot realize higher gains than other traders. In the short run, 
uninformed traders can try to infer the existence of insider information from the 
observation of trading activity, in order to also realize profits. This can either accelerate 
the process of convergence toward the equilibrium, or drive it astray if uninformed 
traders are mistaken in their inferences, as the literature on informational cascades 
demonstrates (Bikhchandani et al., 1998). 
The experimental literature has extensively examined the conditions at which 
financial markets achieve efficiency (see the next section for a review). However, this is 
normally done in settings where agents are either fully informed or not informed, and 
have no connections with others. In this paper we generalize on both of these 
conditions. We allow for all agents to have imperfect information and for some agents 
– whom we call “quasi-insiders” - to have close-to-perfect information. We vary the 
overall amount of information available in the market and the way this is distributed 
among agents. In particular, in a two-by-two design, information is either equally 
distributed among traders or is unequally distributed. In the latter case, “quasi-insiders” 
receive a higher amount of information than other agents. Moreover, the overall 
quantity of information is also modified across our experimental conditions. 
Secondly, we introduce a simple network structure in our financial markets. Each 
agent is connected with two other agents and each has the option to share their own 
private information with the two other agents in their group. The importance of 
networks in financial markets has been stressed both theoretically and empirically. 
According to Aboulafia, (1997), financial markets are embedded into a vast and dense 
network of customary codes of conducts, mutual expectations of appropriate behavior, 
and trust among individual agents. In fact, some accounts stress that the breakdown in 
the networks of trust among financial agents played a major role in precipitating and 
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aggravating the 2008 financial crisis (Kirman, 2010; Anand et al., 2013). According to 
this view, financial markets may share some characteristics with standard markets for 
goods, where social norms and trust networks can cause the actual market price to 
depart from the Walrasian price (Greif, 1993). The effect of trust network in financial 
markets is a largely unexplored issue. We are the first, to the best of our knowledge, to 
examine it experimentally.  Our main research question is whether and how the 
amount, distribution, and the spreading of information through the network, increase 
market efficiency. 
Except for the baseline condition where no agent receives any information, in all 
other experimental conditions all agents receive some noisy signals on the fundamental 
value of the asset. Such signals only reveal the real value of the asset with 70% 
probability. We consider two cases where each agent is either allocated the same 
number of signals as all others or where some “quasi-insiders” are endowed with a 
larger number of signals. The overall number of signals distributed in the market before 
transactions is also manipulated across experimental conditions. 
Our framework enables us to study two different mechanisms for the diffusion of 
information in the market. The first is what we call a “leadership mechanism”, where it 
is common knowledge that one group of quasi-insiders within the market owns ex ante 
more informative signals than all other groups. In some cases quasi-insiders can expect 
to know the real value of the asset with probability greater than 95%2. We expect that 
this mechanism will have important consequences on “information disclosure” (see 
next section) and thus on market efficiency. On the one hand, quasi-insiders will 
presumably try to gain from their informational advantage, and their trading activity 
should, ceteris paribus, drive the asset price in the direction of the fundamental value 
faster than in other cases. On the other hand, less informed traders may pay more 
attention to the price adjustments within the market, because the presence of quasi-
insiders should make them aware of the possibility that prices move in the direction of 
the fundamental faster than in other cases.  
The second channel is what we call a “cooperation mechanism”, whereby agents 
can share their private signal(s) within groups formed by three members, and can in 
                                                             
2 The term “insider” normally characterizes traders who know with probability one the real value of the 
asset. Since in our study traders having informational advantage can never be absolutely certain of the 
real value of the asset, we prefer to call them “quasi-insiders”. See also section 2. 
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turn receive the information shared by the other two members of their group. This is 
done before trading starts, so agents can access the market with a larger number of per 
capita signals, if others in their group have decided to share. In the cooperation 
mechanism, information is therefore multiplied if agents decide to share. If cooperation 
does occur, we expect that transactions will become more informative and, in aggregate, 
prices may incorporate the available information. Manipulating the quantity of signals 
owned by quasi-insiders makes it possible to speculate over the relative strength of 
these two factors. 
Our experimental design includes a baseline condition where no information is 
available to agents, and four treatment conditions that vary both the amount and the 
concentration of signals. Information is evenly distributed among agents in two of such 
treatments,, but the total number of signals is tripled in one treatment compared to the 
other. That is, in one treatment each agent receives one signal, while in the other 
treatment each agent receives three signals. In two other conditions information is 
unevenly distributed between one group of quasi-insiders and three groups of non-
insiders. In these two conditions the total number of signals is kept constant. This 
enables us to evaluate the impact on efficiency of modifying the distribution of signals 
from even to uneven. 
In order to better appreciate the relevance of each of the two mechanisms 
illustrated above, we draw on two different price benchmarks. The first is the “Bayesian 
price”. This is the price that would result if all traders aggregated the information at 
their disposal rationally – namely, according to the Bayes rule – after traders have 
decided whether to share their signals within their group or not. More precisely, 
individual Bayesian prices are computed for each trader, and the market Bayesian price 
is calculated as the arithmetic mean of such individual prices. The second notion is 
what we call “Fama-market efficiency”, and draws on the idea set out at the beginning 
of the paper that prices should incorporate all the information present in the market. 
For Fama-efficiency we do not consider signals being shared in the “cooperation stage”, 
but we only consider the information available before such a stage. Here we compute 
what we call the “Fama-efficient” price as that resulting from the assumption that each 
agent knew the whole information present in the market. 
We find that the “leadership mechanism” unambiguously brings about more 
efficiency than the "cooperation mechanism”. Interestingly, we also find that increasing 
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the quantity of signals does not necessarily lead to appreciable gains in efficiency. In 
particular, efficiency is not higher in the symmetric treatment having thrice as many 
signals as the alternative symmetric treatment. Likewise, efficiency is not higher in the 
asymmetric treatment having overall twice as many signals as the alternative 
asymmetric treatment. Nonetheless, the two asymmetric treatments bring about 
appreciably more efficiency than the symmetric ones. We speculate that the main 
driver of this result is non-insiders extracting information from market prices more 
actively than in symmetric treatments.  
Our study is of interest for the theoretical issue of whether markets are capable 
of efficiently aggregating and disseminating private information. We innovate on 
previous literature (see next section) by generalizing the standard framework in the 
two directions mentioned above. That is, we allow for all agents to receive imperfect 
signals, comparing cases of equal distribution of the information and unequal 
distribution. We also introduce a network structure whereby agents can share their 
private information. We believe that our study is also relevant for policy issues. 
Investigating how market efficiency is affected by increasing information or spreading 
it more evenly, and how information spreads within networks, are all important 
questions for the optimal management of financial markets. Both in normal times but, 
even more so, in times of “crisis”, financial authorities may decide to release additional 
pieces of information to stabilize markets. Our experimental evidence may help 
understand how to do this optimally. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present 
a review of relevant literature and in the third section the experimental design. In 
section 4 we present the methodology of the analysis, then in section 5 we report the 
results obtained. Sections 6 discusses the results and 7 conclude. 
 
2 Related Literature 
Experimental studies dealing with informational efficiency are typically divided into 
three types. The first one is the dissemination of information from identically informed 
agents - normally referred to as “insiders” - to uninformed traders (Plott and Sunder, 
1982). The second strand includes studies about information aggregation among 
market participants with less than perfect information (Plott and Sunder, 1988). The 
third one focuses on the simultaneous equilibrium in asset and information markets 
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(Sunder, 1992). Theoretically, the information aggregation process can be expected to 
be more sluggish in achieving market efficiency than the dissemination one. In the 
dissemination case insiders’ transactions release unambiguous signals about the value 
of the asset, at least when the presence of insiders is common knowledge. Conversely, 
in the aggregation case the process of retrieving information is by construction subject 
to errors. Consequently, making inference on the true state of the world is more 
problematic in the latter case. Comprehensive recent surveys on experimental financial 
markets can be found in Noussair and Tucker (2013), and Morone and Nuzzo (2016). 
Hayek (1945) and Muth (1961) argued that markets never fail in aggregating the 
available information. In a pioneering work, Plott and Sunder (1988) studied 
information aggregation in three differently designed markets and showed that this is 
not generally the case. In particular, while the price mechanism efficiently aggregated 
the dispersed information both in markets where participants traded a complete set of 
Arrow-Debreu securities and in markets where traders had identical payoff structures, 
aggregation failed in single security markets where traders were paid different 
dividends upon the realization of uncertainty. The authors explained this result arguing 
that traders cannot infer the contingent state of the market from other agents’ trading 
behavior when their payoff structures differ. Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) found that, 
in spite of heterogeneous dividend structures in incomplete markets, information was 
correctly aggregated whenever the dividend distribution was common knowledge 
among traders and the subjects had previously experienced the trading institution.  
Other studies found even more negative results on the capacity of markets to 
aggregate information under more general conditions than the ones considered in 
previous studies. O'Brien and Srivastava (1991) showed that, even with uniform and 
common dividend distributions, markets did not manage to aggregate the dispersed 
information if some elements of complexity (multi-period assets, no common 
knowledge about information distribution) are introduced in the market design. Noeth 
et al. (1999) found that information aggregation might be hindered by the existence of 
“information traps”. In particular, misaligned patterns, in which actions are based on 
wrong beliefs about others’ informative set, can result in information not being 
correctly revealed into prices. Brandouy et al. (2000) provided further evidence about 
price formation, asymmetric information and traders’ behaviour, in the context of 
asymmetric and possibly misleading information in a (double-auction) stock market. 
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They found that asymmetric information released its effect into the market only when 
it is common knowledge among market participants. Plott et al. (2003) found that 
information aggregation strictly depends on the environment complexity. While the 
competitive equilibrium (rational expectations model) is very likely to hold in simpler 
contexts, private information based models are generally more accurate in more 
complicated environments. In a market where information about the intrinsic value of 
an asset is cumulatively distributed among traders, Huber et al. (2008) proved the 
existence of a wide range of levels of information for which acquiring additional 
information did not produce higher gains. A positive relationship between information 
and higher profits was detected only for very high information levels.  
Among the studies that analyzed the impact of insider information, Schotter and 
Yorulmazer (2009) found that releasing information to some insiders helped to 
decrease the rate of bank runs in an experiment over banking crisis. As we shall see, we 
obtain a similar result in the context of financial markets, as the presence of insiders 
raises efficiency (see section 4). 
Similarly to the studies dealing with information aggregation, in our experimental 
markets all agents are only imperfectly informed on the fundamental value of the asset. 
No trader is given enough information to know with certainty the future value of the 
asset. Nonetheless, we introduce two major novelties. First, in two of our experimental 
conditions “quasi-insiders” receive a larger number of signals than others. Although we 
can not, strictly speaking, talk about a process of dissemination of information, we are 
nonetheless interested in studying the impact on market efficiency of centralizing 
information in the hands of few agents.  
Second, differently from all previous studies, in our design traders are given the 
chance to share their information set with the other members of their group before 
trading begins. We expect that trust and reciprocity may prove relevant motivations as 
found in the literature studying standard cooperation problems (Fehr and Fischbacher, 
2002). In fact, group attachment and social identity may also play a role (Brewer, 2008). 
The presence of quasi-insider may either induce a stronger sense of identity in groups 
of non-quasi-insiders, or a heightened perception of the unfairness of the process (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Trautmann, 2009; Krawczyk, 2011). In both cases we would expect 
groups of less-informed traders to increase cooperation in comparison with symmetric 
treatments. This would lead to smoothing the information distribution heterogeneity 
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and to increasing the flow of information among traders3. To the best of our knowledge, 
our paper is the first studying information aggregation in a framework where 
cooperation, reciprocity and leadership all matter to agents’ choices and price 
dynamics. 
 
3 Experimental Design 
3.1 General Design 
We run 27 independent experimental markets where a total of 324 agents traded a 
generic financial asset. Each agent was provided with 1000 tokens and ten units of 
asset. Each token was worth 0,02 Euros. At the end of the trading period, the asset paid 
an uncertain dividend D, which could be worth ten tokens or zero tokens, depending 
on two equally likely states of the world. At the beginning of the period, agents received 
partially informative signal(s) on the fundamental value of the security. Before trading 
started, in what we call the sharing stage, each trader independently decided whether 
or not to reveal her signal(s) to the other two members of her group or not. 
We designed four treatments in addition to a baseline condition where no agent 
received any information. In treatment 1 (T1) all agents received one signal; in 
treatment 2 (T2) basic-informed agents received one signal and quasi-insider agents 
received three signals; in treatment 3 (T3) all agents received three signals; in 
treatment 4 (T4) basic-informed agents received one signal and quasi-insider agents 
received nine signals. Three markets were run for the baseline condition, while six 
markets were run for each of the four treatments. 
This design allows us to consider several invariants for treatments comparison. 
T1 and T2 differ because of the presence of quasi-insiders but preserve the amount of 
information given to basic-informed agents. T3 and T4 differ because of the presence 
of quasi-insiders agents but preserve the total amount of information in the market. T1 
and T3 do not include quasi-insiders agents but differ in the amount of information 
given to basic-informed agents. T2 and T4 both include quasi-insiders but differ in the 
amount of additional information given to them.  
                                                             
3 In a companion paper, we study in detail how sensitive the pre-trade cooperation mechanism is to the 
presence of quasi-insiders. 
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Each market included 23 trading periods, three of which were trial periods while 
all of the 20 ensuing periods were paid off. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and was run at the Laboratory for Experimental Economics (LEE) 
of Universitat Jaume I (Castello n, Spain). Instructions are reported in the Appendix G. 
 
3.2  State of information 
In all cases except the baseline, traders received partially informative signal(s) on the 
future value of the asset dividend before trading started. Signals were not 100% 
reliable. Assuming that the true dividend to be paid at the end of the period was ten 
(zero), the probability of getting a signal indicating that the dividend would be ten 
(zero) was p. (1 – p) was therefore the probability of getting a private signal indicating 
that the dividend would be ten (zero) while the true value of the dividend was instead 
zero (ten). In other words, p was the probability that the signal reveals the true value 
of the dividend, while 1-p is the complementary probability that the signal indicated a 
wrong value of the dividend. We set p equal to 70%. The value of p was common 
knowledge among subjects. 
At the beginning of the experimental session, in each market 12 traders were 
randomly assigned to four different groups, each composed by three traders. The group 
composition was fixed throughout the session. Before trading began, subjects went 
through a sharing stage, in which they simultaneously decided whether or not to share 
their signal(s) with others in their group. Information sharing could only occur with 
components of the same group. Moreover, if one trader decided to share her 
information, all his or her signal(s) would be shared within the group. No deception 
when sharing signals was allowed. 
 
 Treatment T1 T2 T3 T4 Baseline 
P
a
n
el
 A
 
Ex-Ante 
Number of signals 
distributed to 
“basic informed” 
traders 
1 1 3 1 - 
Number of signals 
distributed to 
“quasi insider” 
traders 
- 3 - 9 - 
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Per capita number 
of signals 
distributed in the 
market  
1 1.5 3 3 - 
P
a
n
el
 B
 
Ex-Post 
Per capita number 
of signals 
available to “basic 
informed” traders 
2.18 2.16 5.90 2.23 - 
Per capita number 
of signals 
available to “quasi 
insider” traders 
- 5.82 - 16.70 - 
Per capita number 
of signals in the 
market 
2.18 3.07 5.90 5.84 - 
Information 
sharing multiplier 2.18 2.04 1.96 1.94 - 
Table 1: Treatments design and distribution of information ex ante and ex post 
Note: Table 1, Panel A reports the number of signals distributed to basic-informed agents and quasi-
insiders in each treatment before the sharing stage takes place. The per capita number of signal is also 
computed. Panel B reports the per capita number of signals owned by basic-informed traders and quasi-
insiders after the sharing stage has taken place. The information sharing multiplier is computed as the 
ratio between the per capita number of signals after and before the sharing stage. It therefore measures 
the extent to which information spreads in the market in each treatment as an effect of agents’ sharing 
behavior. 
 
At the end of each session, the total earnings, computed as the sum of the profits 
in each of the 20 paying periods, was communicated and paid out to traders. The 
average earnings were 24.6€ per subject for about two hours of session duration. 
The distribution of signals between the two types of agents is summarized in 
Table 1. We show the structure of both the ex-ante (Panel A) and ex-post (Panel B) 
signals distribution. While the former displays just the exogenous source of 
information, the latter crucially depends on whether or not traders decided to share 
their private information within their group. In the last line of Table 1 we compute the 
“Information sharing multiplier” as the ratio between the “Average number of ex-post 
signals in the market” and the “Average number of signals ex-ante distributed in the 
market”. The “Information sharing multiplier” is then an index to quantify the impact 
of the “cooperation” mechanism on the increase of subjects’ average private 
information. 
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4 Notions of market efficiency and hypotheses  
4.1  Benchmark derivation, price discovery and market efficiency 
In our empirical analysis we will draw on four different price benchmarks. Each of them 
embodies a theoretical prediction and will be tested against actual prices from our 
experimental markets to account for market efficiency. 
The dividend value, randomly determined by the z-tree software at the beginning 
of each period, but unknown to agents until the end of the period, constitutes our first 
benchmark. The dividend represents the fundamental value of the asset. 
A second price benchmark is the expected value of the dividend distribution. In 
the baseline condition, where no private information is available in the market, we 
should expect prices to exhibit a random walk process around five tokens, that is, the 
ex ante expected value of the asset. For this reason, we refer to the ex ante expected 
value of the dividend distribution using the terminology “uninformed price”. 
Our third price benchmark hinges upon the Bayes rule. This describes how agents 
update their beliefs after they receive new information. The crucial assumption under 
the Bayes rule is that agents are rational. Then, according to the Bayes rule, agents 
should be able to efficiently update their prior information by processing the arrival of 
new signals in their information set. 
To compute the Bayes price benchmark, we draw on the approach proposed by 
Alfarano et al. (2011, 2015). In particular, when computing the Bayes price we take into 
consideration the ex-post traders’ information set, i.e. the information set after the 
sharing stage. With reference to each trading period of a given market, the procedure 
starts from the classic formulation of Bayesian inference: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑗(𝐷 = 10|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 ) =
𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 |𝐷 = 10) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 10)
𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 )
 
where D=10 refers to the event of the dividend being equal to ten. We denote 
with  𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗  the series of signals – i.e. the information set – owned by trader j after the 
sharing stage and at the beginning of the trading stage. 𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 10) denotes the non-
conditional probability of observing the event 𝐷 = 10; we also refer to this as “prior 
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probability”. This is by construction equal to 
1
2
 .  𝑃𝑟𝑗(𝐷 = 10|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 )  is trader j ‘s 
probability of observing the high value dividend conditional on her information set 
after the sharing stage.  
Since there are only two possible states of the world, we can compute the 
probability that trader j attributes to the event of observing the low value dividend 
conditional on his or her information set in the trading stage as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑗(𝐷 = 0|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 ) = 1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 10|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 ) 
 
We introduce the following variables: 
 𝑝  is the probability that a single private signal is correct; 
  𝑞 = 1 − 𝑝 is the probability that a single private signal is incorrect; 
 𝑥𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗  is the number of signals indicating that the value of the dividend will be 10 
in trader j’s information set in the trading stage; 
 𝑋𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗
 
is the total number of signals in trader j’s information set in the trading 
stage. 
We then define trader j’s aggregate net private signals in the trading stage as follows: 
 
𝜂𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 = 2 ∙ 𝑥𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 − 𝑋𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗
.
 
Finally, we compute the probabilities of both high and low dividend conditional 
on trader j’s information set in the trading stage; i.e. the “Bayes probabilities”: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑗(𝐷 = 10 | 𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 ) = [1 + (
𝑞
𝑝
)
𝜂𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗
]
−1
 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑗(𝐷 = 0 | 𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 ) = [1 + (
𝑝
𝑞
)
𝜂𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗
]
−1
 
Since each trader has her own Bayes probability, in each trading period we take 
the mean of the Bayes probabilities and we compute the Bayes price by weighting each 
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dividend value by the respective probability of observing it conditionally on the 
information set; 
 
𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =
1
𝑀
∑ [10 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑗(𝐷 = 10|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 ) + 0 ∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑗(𝐷 = 0|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑗 )]
𝑀
𝑗=1  
where M denotes the total number of subjects trading in a period.
 
Finally, we define our fourth benchmark as the Fama-efficient price. We recall that 
the market is said to be Fama-efficient if, at any instant of time, all the available 
information is incorporated into the prices. In our framework, this would mean that 
each agent trades as if he or she knew both her signals and all other agents’ signals as 
well. In other words, if traders manage to infer others’ information, prices are expected 
to converge toward the efficient price. 
Differently from the Bayes price formulation, when computing the Fama-efficient 
price we consider the total number of signals distributed before the sharing stage. This 
computation is affected neither by the information set of each subject nor by 
information sharing. Then, we compute the efficient price as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 10 ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 10|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒) + 0 ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 0|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒) 
As we can see, in the efficient price formulation we consider the ex-ante market 
information set, i.e. the information set in the sharing stage. Similarly to the previous 
case,  
 
𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 10|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒) =
𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒|𝐷 = 10) ∙ 𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 10)
𝑃𝑟(𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒)
= [1 + (
𝑞
𝑝
)
𝜂𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒
]
−1
 
 
𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 0|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒) = 1 − 𝑃𝑟(𝐷 = 10|𝐼𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒) = [1 + (
𝑝
𝑞
)
𝜂𝑒𝑥−𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒
]
−1
 
are the probabilities of observing the low or high dividend conditional on the 
market information set in the sharing stage. 
The crucial difference with respect to the Bayes price is in the interpretation of 
net signals. When we compute the Bayes price we refer to the net signals owned by 
each subject. Then, first the Bayes price for each trader is computed; secondly the 
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arithmetic mean of subjects’ Bayes prices is taken into account as a proxy for the Bayes 
price in each period. Differently, in the efficient price formulation, we consider the sum 
of the net signals across all agents. From a theoretical point of view, the Bayesian 
probability updating is affected by information overweighting. This is the case because 
any shared piece of information (signal) will be accounted more than once, whenever 
shared. This occurs because not only is the same signal processed by one agent, but 
also, if shared, by other group members. For this reason, the Bayes price is theoretically 
more distortive than the Fama-efficient price. Moreover, contrary to the uninformed 
and the dividend prices, the Bayes and the Fama-efficient targets crucially depend on 
both the quantity and the composition of the information in the market. By composition 
we mean the ratio between the total number of signals indicating that the dividend will 
be paid and the total number of signals indicating that the dividend will not be paid, as 
determined by the random generator of information in the market. Since the Bayes 
price depends on the information available to each agent after the information sharing 
stage, then both the number of signals with which traders are initially provided, and 
the number of signals that are shared, matter for the determination of the Bayes price. 
Conversely, only the total quantity of signals in the market and their composition 
influence the Fama-efficient price level. Therefore, contrary to the Bayes price, the 
efficient price is not affected by cooperation among traders. In this sense, for the law of 
large numbers, a more precise correspondence between the efficient and the dividend 
price is likely to occur as the number of total signals increases.4 
After computing the relevant benchmarks, we measure how accurately actual 
prices track each benchmark. We do this by computing the root mean squared error 
(RMSE) between actual prices and each benchmark. We do this for each transaction 
occurred in the market from the beginning to the end of the trading period. Technically, 
the RMSE is used as an index of proximity of actual prices with respect to the theoretical 
predictions. The formulation is reported below: 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸 = [
1
𝑛
∑(𝑇𝑃𝑖 − 𝐵𝑃)
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
]
1
2
 
                                                             
4 In fact, our data show that the efficient price is all the time the nearest (or at least equally close) 
benchmark to the fundamental asset value. 
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where: 
 𝐵𝑃 represents the benchmark price; 
 𝑇𝑃𝑖  represents the actual price of transaction i; 
  𝑛 stands for the total number of transactions. 
The lower the RMSE, the more the market is trading in proximity of a given 
theoretical prediction. Then, if the market is efficient, we should expect to find smaller 
value of the RMSE over the efficient price with respect to both the uninformed price 
and the Bayes price. This would mean that all the relevant information is correctly and 
instantaneously incorporated into actual prices. 
 
4.2 Hypotheses set 
In this section we lay out the main hypotheses that we want to examine in our 
analysis. Given the exploratory nature of our study, in which two different mechanisms 
affecting information aggregation are for the first time jointly analyzed, we lack a 
theoretical basis to make a priori predictions on their relative effects. For this reason, 
we report below a series of “null hypotheses” corresponding to the case of absence of 
treatment effects, and two alternative hypotheses where treatment effects can go in 
either direction. 
The first hypothesis we want to examine is whether information distribution affects 
market efficiency, keeping the amount of information constant in the market. To do this, 
we compare market efficiency in T3 and T4. 36 signals were distributed in the market 
in either treatment. However, while in T3 each subject received three signals, i.e. the 
information distribution was uniform and symmetric, in T4 three subjects belonging to 
the same group were provided with nine signals each (quasi-insider) and the remaining 
subjects were given only one signal each. We thus formulate hypothesis 1 and its 
alternatives. 
Hypothesis 1: Keeping constant the total number of signals, when information 
is uniformly distributed prices exhibit the same deviation from the efficient price as 
when quasi-insider agents are present in the market. 
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Alternative Hypothesis 1(a): Keeping constant the total number of signals, 
prices exhibit a significant closer convergence to the efficient price when information 
is uniformly distributed. 
Alternative Hypothesis 1(b): Keeping constant the total number of signals, 
prices exhibit a significant closer convergence to the efficient price when quasi-insider 
agents are present in the market, i.e. when information is centralized. 
As a second step, considering those cases in which quasi-insider agents are 
present in the market (T2 and T4), we test whether an increase in the number of quasi-
insiders’ per capita signals improves the convergence toward the efficient price. Indeed, 
in T2 and T4, while basic informed agents were provided with one signal each, quasi-
insider agents (three subjects who belong to the same group) were given three and nine 
signals each respectively. Therefore, we formulate hypothesis 2 and its alternatives. 
Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, when quasi-insider agents are provided 
with three signals each, prices exhibit the same deviation from the efficient price as 
when quasi-insider agents are provided with nine signals each. 
Alternative Hypothesis 2(a): Other things being equal, when quasi-insider 
agents are provided with three signals each, prices exhibit a significant closer 
convergence to the efficient price than when they are provided with nine signals 
each. 
Alternative Hypothesis 2(b): Other things being equal, when quasi-insider 
agents are provided with nine signals each, prices exhibit a significant closer 
convergence to the efficient price than when they are provided with three signals 
each. 
Finally, considering the cases where information is uniformly distributed among 
traders (T1 and T3), we test whether increasing the number of signals in the market 
impacts on market efficiency. This can be tested because each agent is provided with 
one and three signal(s) in T1 and T3, respectively. Our third hypothesis and its 
alternatives are stated below: 
Hypothesis 3: When information is uniformly distributed and traders are 
provided with one signal each, prices exhibit the same deviation from the efficient 
price as when traders are provided with three signals each. 
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Alternative Hypothesis 3(a): When information is uniformly distributed, 
prices exhibit a significant closer convergence to the efficient price when traders are 
provided with one signal each. 
Alternative Hypothesis 3(b): When information is uniformly distributed, 
prices exhibit a significant closer convergence to the efficient price when traders are 
provided with three signals each. 
 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Information sharing 
We first analyze how traders use the option to share their private information; secondly 
we present results on market outcomes.  
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how subjects use the cooperation mechanism. They 
report the average number of signals shared in each of the six markets comprising a 
given treatment for basic informed agents’ (Figure 1) and quasi-insider agents (Figure 
2). 
 
 
Figure 1: Information sharing by basic-informed 
agents 
 
 
Figure 2: Info sharing by quasi-insiders agents  
 
 
 
We first compare information sharing patterns in T1 and T3, where no quasi-
insider agent is present. Throughout our descriptive analysis, we consider each market as 
yielding one independent observation. Indeed, since the same group of people within a market 
interact over several periods, within-group observations are serially interdependent. This 
property makes it suitable  to consider each group (market) as an independent observation, e.g. 
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by computing the mean (median) of the variable of interest over the periods comprising a given 
market (see Fre chette, 2012). We note that traders cooperate significantly less in T3 (two-
tailed k-sample median test: N = 6; Pearson chi square = 5.33; P = 0.021. See also Table 
A1, Appendix A). This is likely the consequence of traders’ initial information set being 
larger in T3 compared to T1. Agents can thus be more confident in T3 than T1 that their 
information set is sufficient to indicate the true state of the world. In other words, the 
expected benefits from cooperation is lower in T3 than T1, hence the incentives to 
share information are also lower. 
We also find that the level of information sharing among basic informed agents 
does not significantly change when quasi-insider agents are introduced in the market, 
as can be seen in the comparison between T1 - agents provided with one signal each - and 
T2 - basic informed and quasi-insider agents provided with one and three signals each, 
respectively - (two-tailed k-sample median test: N = 6; Pearson chi square = 0.00; P = 1.000. 
See also Table A2, Appendix A) and between T1 and T4 - basic informed and quasi-insider 
agents provided with one and nine signals each respectively – (two-tailed k-sample median 
test: N = 6; Pearson chi square = 0.00; P = 1.000. See also Table A3, Appendix A). 
Furthermore, moving from T2 to T4, the median percentage of basic informed traders 
sharing their information set switches from 57.22% to 63.61%. Yet, this difference is 
not statistically significant (two-tailed k-sample median test: N = 6; Pearson chi square = 
0.00; P = 1.000. See also Table A4, Appendix A). Finally, no significant difference (two-
tailed k-sample median test: N = 6; Pearson chi square = 1.33; P = 0.248. See also Table A5, 
Appendix A) emerges between quasi-insiders’ information sharing behavior in T2 and 
T4, although it is apparent from Figure 2 that sharing is lower in T4 than T2. This 
behavior presumably follows the same reasons as the drop in sharing for basic 
informed agents in T3 relative to T1. That is, a higher number of initial signals for each 
agent reduces their need to cooperate with others. Our conjecture (see section 2) that 
procedural unfairness in the asymmetric treatments may have led to stronger “group 
spirit” in basic-informed agents is thus disconfirmed by the data. As found in a 
companion paper, though, some other identity effects, which are not relevant for the 
present paper, seem nonetheless to emerge.  
  
5.2 Market Efficiency 
5.2.1 General Overview 
 19 
Figures 5-8 report the box-plots of the RMSE distribution for each of the benchmark 
prices in each treatment. These graphs pool RMSE over periods and markets. A more 
detailed overview can be found in Figures B1, B2, B3, B4, and B5 in Appendix B. There 
we show the actual evolution of the traded prices in relation to the benchmark prices, 
broken down by market and period.  
First, we note a clear difference between the baseline condition and all other 
treatments. The uninformed and dividend price RMSE distributions are shifted 
downward and upward, respectively, in comparison to all other treatments. Through 
the use of a Tobit regression analysis (see Appendix C, Model C1), we find that the 
uninformed price RMSE in the baseline is significantly lower than that computed in 
each of the other treatments (P < 0.001 in all the four pairwise comparisons). On the 
contrary, we find that the dividend price RMSE distribution in the baseline condition is 
significantly higher with respect to that computed in each of the other treatments (P < 
0.05 in all the four pairwise comparisons). This preliminary analysis shows that when 
no information is present in the market, trade prices remain significantly closer to the 
uninformed price and further away from the dividend price than when some 
information is present in the market. In particular, we note that this difference is more 
pronounced for the uninformed price than the dividend price. It is relatively easier for 
markets with information to depart away from the uninformed price than to come 
closer to the fundamental in comparison to markets without information. In fact, trade 
prices in the baseline condition exhibit a random walk process around the expected 
value of the dividend distribution, and in no case prices reach the dividend value (see 
Figure B5, Appendix B). We employ a Tobit regression model (see Appendix C, Model 
C2) to assess whether, when no information is in the market, the distance between 
trade prices and the uninformed price is lower than the distance between trade prices 
and the fundamental value of the asset. This is the standard assumption in markets 
with no information, and it is, not surprisingly, confirmed  in our case (coeff. = -4.18; P 
< 0.001). This preliminary evidence ensures that agents were able to exploit the 
available information and traded at prices that were further away from the uninformed 
price and closer to the fundamental asset value than in the baseline. 
 20 
  
Figure 5: RMSE Distribution, Uninformed Price Figure 6: RMSE Distribution, Bayes Price 
  
  
Figure 7: RMSE Distribution, Efficient Price Figure 8: RMSE Distribution, Dividend 
 
Among the treatments with information, we note some tendency for the 
uniformed price RMSE to increase as we move from T1 to T4, and correspondingly 
(though less markedly so) for the dividend price RMSE to decrease as we move from T1 
to T4. This may signal that the combination of adding information and centralizing 
information helps agents to trade at prices that are closer to the fundamental. 
Nevertheless, we note no clear pattern with respect to either the Bayes RMSE or the 
Fama-efficient price.  
We conjecture that this apparent lack of treatment differences in the Bayes and 
Fama-efficient RMSE may be due to learning effects. Learning may occur because 
agents update their decision-making rules as they accumulate trading experience. 
Agents can improve their ability to infer information from the other traders’ activity 
over the course of 20 periods. Agents may also update their cooperation strategies over 
time, thus also affecting the way markets spread information. In fact, time series plots 
in Appendix B typically exhibit proximity to uninformed or Bayesian prices in early 
periods, and proximity to the Fama-efficient price in the late periods of the session. For 
instance, in market 1 from session 2 and T2 (see appendix B, Figure B2), uninformed 
trades dominate the first three periods, prices then converge to the Bayes price in 
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periods from four to nine, and prices track the efficient equilibrium price for all later 
periods. This suggests a pattern whereby agents trade as if they were uninformed in 
the earliest periods, process their own private information in intermediate periods, and 
eventually manage to correctly pool the information dispersed in the market in the final 
periods. Learning may thus be relevant not only to account for individual behavior but 
also for its impact on market performance.  
For these reasons, we split our descriptive results into the first and second block 
of ten periods in each market5 and report on the benchmarks performance rates over 
the four treatments. We identify for each period of each market which benchmark price 
is best able to approximate the actual transaction prices. More precisely, we select the 
benchmark price with the lowest RMSE value from actual prices6. Essentially, in each 
treatment we count how many times a given benchmark best approximates our data. 
Table 2 reports the percentages of each benchmark being selected as the one with the 
lowest RMSE. 
Performance Rates 
  Uninformed Price Bayes Price Efficient Price Dividend 
Treat. 1 First Half 45.00% 45.00% 10.00% 0.00% 
Treat. 1 Second Half 45.00% 38.33% 16.67% 0.00% 
Treat. 2 First Half 43.33% 46.67% 10.00% 0.00% 
Treat. 2 Second Half 21.67% 28.33% 50.00% 0.00% 
Treat. 3 First Half 50.00% 50.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Treat. 3 Second Half 35.00% 46.67% 18.33% 0.00% 
Treat. 4 First Half 43.33% 48.33% 8.33% 0.00% 
Treat. 4 Second Half 15.00% 38.33% 46.67% 0.00% 
Baseline First Half 100.00% / / 0.00% 
Baseline Second Half 100.00% / / 0.00% 
                                                             
5 Box-Plots are reported in Appendix D. 
6In case of ties between RMSE for two or more benchmarks, we select the least efficient benchmark. This 
is on the one hand the most conservative criterion for our analysis and on the other hand permits 
performance rates to always sum up to 100%. 
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Table 2: Benchmark performance rates, grouped by treatment and first or second block of ten periods. 
First, we note that the Dividend price has never the lowest RMSE, denoting the 
difficulty of traders of achieving the fundamental price. With regards to the three other 
benchmarks, in T1 the uninformed and the Bayes prices are the best performing 
benchmarks in both the first and the second 10-block periods, with a performance rate 
of 45% and 45%, respectively, in the first 10-block period, and of 45% and 38.33% in 
the second 10-block period. The efficient price marginally improves from a 
performance rate of 10% in the early periods to a performance rate of 16.67% in late 
periods. Trading in T1 is thus still predominantly uninformed or based on private 
information. 
In T2 the uninformed and the Bayes prices are the best performing ones in early 
periods (with a performance rate of 43.33% and 46.67% respectively). Nevertheless, 
when we move to late periods the efficient price becomes the best tracked benchmark 
(with a performance rate of 50%). It is particularly interesting to note how uninformed 
trades decrease from 43.33% to 21.67% and efficient trades increase from 10% to 50% 
when moving from early to late periods. This evidence shows that, over time, traders 
improve their ability to infer and aggregate the information dispersed in the market. 
In T3 results are remarkably similar to T1. Both the uninformed and the Bayes 
prices perform better in accounting for our data than the efficient price in both early 
and late periods. In particular, in the second ten-round block, the Bayes price is the best 
tracked benchmark with a performance rate of 46.67%. It is remarkable that, in spite 
of the number of initial signals being ex ante three times as high in T3, we observe 
market prices to have the same levels of proximity to the efficient price and the Bayes 
price as in T1. This is not due to the fact that the ex post number of signals is similar in 
the two treatments. As Table 1, Panel B, shows, agents in T3 have a significantly (Mann 
Whitney U test: N7 = 6; z = -2.882; P < 0.0039) larger amount of information (5.90 signals 
per capita) than in T1 (2.18 signals per capita). The ex post ratio of number of signals 
is 2.70, which is less than the ex ante ratio of 3:1 because agents shared on average less 
in T3 than T1. The bad performance of the efficient price suggests that traders are 
mainly concerned with processing their own private information than trying to infer 
others’ information through the observation of price signals.  
                                                             
7 Market averages of the ex-post signals distribution are used to account for within market correlation. 
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Finally, benchmarks in T4 perform similarly to T2. While the uninformed and the 
Bayes prices exhibit the highest performance rates in early periods (43.33% and 
48.33% respectively), the efficient price performs better in late periods (with a 
performance rate of 46.67%). Even in this case it is remarkable how the efficient price 
performance rate switches from 8.33% to 46.67% moving from early to late periods. 
Here again we note that in spite of a larger number of signals being available in T4 
compared to T2 both ex ante - in a proportion of 2:1 - than ex post - in a proportion of 
1.9:1 (Mann Whitney U test: N8 = 6; z = -2.892; P < 0.0038) – the performance in terms 
of efficiency appear to be virtually the same. 
 
5.2.3 Econometric Analysis 
In this section we perform a thorough econometric analysis of our hypotheses and of 
the conjectures that emerged from the descriptive analysis. For this purpose we use the 
following Tobit regression model: 
 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∙ 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
∙ ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
The RMSE index of actual trader prices with respect to a given price benchmark is the 
dependent variable of the model. Our covariates include a dummy variable 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 for 
each of n markets but one that is omitted. In this way we control for both possible 
hydiosincracies across markets and for the clustering of our data at the market level. 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 is a trend variable capturing the time effect; and ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 is a vector of demographics 
and attitudinal variables9 that are averaged at the market level. 
We test for treatment effects performing Wald tests over the difference between the 
sums of market dummy coefficients belonging to different treatments. That is, to test 
for the null hypothesis of absence of differences between two treatments, we consider 
the null hypothesis: 
                                                             
8 Market averages of the ex-post signals distribution are used to account for within market correlation. 
9 A detailed description of the demographics and attitudinal variables is reported in the note below Table 
E1 (Appendix E). 
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𝐻0: 𝑍𝑟,𝑠 ≡ ∑ βi,r
𝑛𝑟
i=1
− ∑ βi,s
𝑛𝑠
i=1
= 0 
where r and s identify the markets associated with two different treatments. 𝑛𝑟  and 𝑛𝑠 
are the numbers of markets belonging to treatment r and s. Our design includes six 
markets for each treatment. 𝑛𝑟  and 𝑛𝑠 are therefore always equal to six, except for the 
treatment to which the omitted category of the model belongs (Treatment 1). Note that 
the possibility that 𝑛𝑟 > 𝑛𝑠 for comparisons involving Treatment 1 does not affect the 
estimation of our pairwise comparisons, since the omitted category coefficient is 
implicitly zero. 
Since our descriptive analysis highlighted the presence of different price patterns 
between the first and second half market periods, we run the econometric model both 
in the first and the second block of ten periods as well as over the entire set of market 
periods.   
All the regression outputs are reported in Appendix E; all the treatments pairwise 
comparisons are available in Appendix F.  
Here we mainly focus on the results derived from the second block of ten periods. 
Result 1: Hypothesis 1 is rejected. We find that, keeping information constant ex 
ante (36 signals in the market), when quasi-insider agents are active in the market (T4), 
actual prices exhibit a significantly closer convergence to the efficient price with 
respect to the case in which information is uniformly distributed (T3) (𝑍𝑇4,𝑇3 = -4.40; P 
= 0.014). Therefore, keeping constant the quantity of information in the market, a 
centralized information distribution in which some agents are provided with more 
information guarantees more efficiency than a uniform information distribution in 
which all subjects receive the same amount of information. 
Result 2: We cannot reject Hypothesis 2. We find that, other things being equal, 
when quasi-insider traders are given nine signals (T4), market efficiency is not 
significantly higher than when quasi-insider agents are provided with three signals 
each (T2) (𝑍𝑇4,𝑇2 = -0.79; P = 0.710). In other words, when information is polarized, 
providing quasi-insider agents with a greater number of per-capita signals does not 
significantly increase market efficiency.  
Result 3: We cannot reject Hypothesis 3. When information is uniformly 
distributed, switching from a market where subjects are provided with one signal each 
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(T1) to a market where three signals are released to each subject (T3) does not lead to 
a significant increase in the market efficiency level (𝑍𝑇3,𝑇1  = -1.58; P = 0.384). We 
conjecture that the common knowledge that information is uniformly distributed leads 
subjects not to recognize the presence of an informed market leader and, as a 
consequence, not to focus on the others’ trading activity. In fact, the sign of the 
coefficient indicates that the convergence to the efficient price is higher in T1 than in 
T3. This is remarkable, as the number of initial signals is three times higher in T3 than 
in T1 (keeping fixed the uniform distribution in both treatments). We conjecture that 
the greater amount of information in T3 makes traders more confident in being able to 
correctly forecast the asset dividend and makes them less prone to use the market 
trading activity as an inference tool. On the contrary, when provided with only one 
informative signal (as in T1), traders focus more on the market activity to improve their 
chance of properly inferring the asset fundamental value and, consequently, market 
efficiency is improved.  
With regard to the remaining benchmarks, we find that additional information is 
not discarded but is somehow processed by traders. This is evident from the increasing 
pattern over treatments of the uninformed price RMSE in late periods. In other words, 
moving from T1 to T4, as the quantity of information (total number of signals) 
increases, prices depart from the uninformed price. This trend is in place in all the 
pairwise comparisons (𝑍𝑇1,𝑇2 = -4.93; P = 0.00; 𝑍𝑇1,𝑇3 = -3.89; P = 0.000; 𝑍𝑇1,𝑇4 = -8.29; 
P = 0.000; 𝑍𝑇2,𝑇4 = -3.80; P = 0.001; see Table F8, Appendix F) but one (𝑍𝑇2,𝑇3 = 0.40; P 
= 0.717; see Table F8, Appendix F). Interestingly, even if not significant, the sign of the 
Wald test 𝑍𝑇2,𝑇3 appears to contradict the rule “more information less noise”. Indeed, 
although in T3 traders receive twice as many signals as in T2, prices come closer to the 
uninformed price when only basic-informed agents are active in the market (T3)10 . 
Coherently with our results on the efficient price, we also find that even keeping 
identical the amount of information within the market (i.e. in T3 and T4), asymmetric 
information distributions produce lower noise than the case in which information is 
instead symmetrically spread out (𝑍𝑇3,𝑇4 = -4.21; P = 0.000; see Table F8, Appendix F). 
                                                             
10 Interestingly, when information is instead asymmetrically distributed, doubling the overall amount of 
signals leads prices away from the uninformed price (𝑍𝑇2,𝑇4 = -3.80; P = 0.001) 
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Furthermore, even in late periods, trades driven by private information are 
significantly more widespread in treatments where quasi-insiders are not active within 
the market than in alternative treatments (𝑍𝑇1,𝑇2 = -5.90; P = 0.000; 𝑍𝑇1,𝑇4 = -3.38; P = 
0.000; 𝑍𝑇2,𝑇3 = 3.79; P = 0.002; 𝑍𝑇3,𝑇4 = -1.27; P = 0.192; see Table F5, Appendix F). 
The dividend price RMSE distributions over treatments exhibit, as expected, a 
very similar pattern to the one observed in the efficient price case (see Tables F10, F11, 
and F12, Appendix F). 
 
6. Discussion 
The main result of our paper is that only when quasi-insider agents are active in the 
market traders manage to infer the aggregate information. Consequently, prices come 
closer to the competitive equilibrium than in alternative treatments where quasi-
insiders are absent. The comparison between T2 and T3 is quite telling in this respect. 
Quasi-insiders in T2 receive the same number of signals as basic informed agents in T3. 
The overall number of ex ante signals is twice as high in T3 as in T2. Nonetheless, T2 
achieves higher rates of proximity to the efficient price than T3, both in the final ten 
periods (Z=-3,60; P=0.068) and over the whole 20 rounds (Z=-2,77; P=0.031; see Table 
F2). This rules out the number of signals as being the relevant aspect to improve 
efficiency, leaving the “leadership” aspect as the crucial one. Moreover, increasing the 
number of signals does not necessarily lead to increased efficiency. This is the case for 
both cases in which quasi-insiders are present or absent. Endowing quasi-insiders with 
nine rather than three signals did not lead to higher efficiency – as the comparison 
between T2 and T4 clearly shows. Likewise, tripling the number of signals to basic 
informed agents, in the absence of quasi-insiders, did not lead to increased efficiency 
either. - This suggests that it is the presence of agents with privileged information per 
se, rather than the mere availability of more information, which appears to be the 
crucial characteristic to increase efficiency in a market. 
Why is the presence of leaders, i.e. agents with privileged information, more 
important than cooperation to increase efficiency? As already mentioned in section 2, 
Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009) find a similar result in an experiment on bank runs. In 
line with existing research (see section 2), we conjectured that it is the awareness that 
someone else is better informed that leads traders to focus on others’ behavior and on 
the information that prices can convey, rather than concentrating mainly on their own 
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information. The knowledge that quasi-insiders are active in the market urges basic-
informed agents to become more concerned with extracting information from the 
market rather than their own information set. On the contrary, when information is 
distributed uniformly, traders do not pay as much attention to market prices, but rather 
merely focus on processing their own private information. This behavior prevents the 
market from achieving the efficient equilibrium price. Our design prevents us from 
exploring alternative accounts. One may argue for instance that quasi-insiders use 
different trading strategies than basic-informed agents. The specific strategies chosen 
by quasi-insiders may thus facilitate the transmission of information to the whole 
market. For instance, quasi-insiders may trade more “aggressively”, i.e. increasing the 
frequency of transactions and trading at prices closer to the fundamental value of the 
asset.  Future research should ascertain whether it is the awareness mechanism or 
other mechanisms the main driver of our results.  
Our experiment shows the relevant – and somewhat surprising – effects that the 
distribution of information among agents has on efficiency. Concentration of 
information in the hands of few leaders, rather than uniform dispersion of information, 
seems the best mechanism to ensure closer proximity to the efficient price. In this 
sense, any policy makers’ effort to equalize the information distribution in the market 
may result to be unsuccessful, at least as far as efficiency is concerned. Moreover, the 
cooperation mechanism seems much less relevant than the leadership mechanism in 
improving efficiency. This may be partly due to traders’ reluctance to share information 
when they acquire more signals, as the comparison between T1 and T3 shows. Taken 
at face value, our results would suggest that policy makers should focus their action on 
making the presence of quasi-insiders common knowledge among market participants. 
However, this is clearly impractical both on legal and ethical grounds. We believe that a 
more sensible approach would be to “nudge” traders on the importance to extract 
information on the market fundamentals from prices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). If 
our interpretation is correct, the lower efficiency achieved in treatments without quasi-
insiders is mainly due to their focusing on private information rather than information 
coming from the markets. Hence, higher efficiency may be achieved by prompting 
individuals to base their trading decisions on information coming from market 
transactions in addition to their own private information sets.  
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7. Conclusions 
Motivated by the debate on the relationship between market efficiency and privileged 
information, we studied a market where heterogeneously informed traders were 
provided with less-than perfect information about the fundamental value of a generic 
asset. Differently from previous research on the topic, after providing traders with 
partially informative signals on the asset real value, we gave them the chance to share 
their information set before trading. Quasi-insider agents were present in two of the 
four treatments in which information was released. Uniformly informed traders were 
active in the market in the other two treatments. Increasing the number of per-capita 
signals when information is uniformly distributed and increasing the number of quasi-
insider traders’ per-capita signals when information is centralized were the two key 
variants over treatments. 
Our research has shown that the way information is distributed within an experimental 
financial market has a significant effect on efficiency. We contrasted a “cooperation” 
mechanism – namely, the possibility for agents to share information within a restricted 
group of agents – and a “leadership” mechanism – that is, the presence of privileged 
agents, which is common knowledge. At the same time, we manipulated the quantity of 
signals initially present in the market. Our results clearly indicate that the mere 
presence of privileged agents suffices to improve efficiency, and that, when this is the 
case, providing the markets with additional information does not necessarily lead to 
additional efficiency. We claimed that this result is due to an “attention shift” by basic 
informed traders. More research needs to be done to better ascertain the validity the 
underlying mechanisms driving these results. Nonetheless, we believe that the present 
paper has uncovered important and thus far neglected effects of both the concentration 
and the overall amount of information present in a financial market. 
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APPENDIX A 
  T1 T3 Total 
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s 
Lower than the 
median 
1 5 6 
Greater than the 
median 
5 1 6 
Total 6 6 12 
Pearson chi-square (1) = 5.3333    P = 0.021 
Table A1: Median test on information sharing 
(treaments 1 and 3) 
  T1 T2 Total 
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s 
Lower than the 
median 
3 3 6 
Greater than the 
median 
3 3 6 
Total 6 6 12 
Pearson chi-square (1) = 0.0000    P = 1.000 
Table A2: Median test on information sharing (treat-
ments 1 and 2), only basic-informed included 
  T1 T4 Total 
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s 
Lower than the 
median 
3 3 6 
Greater than the 
median 
3 3 6 
Total 6 6 12 
Pearson chi-square (1) = 0.0000    P = 1.000 
Table A3: Median test on information sharing (treat-
ments 1 and 4), only basic-informed included 
  T2 T4 Total 
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s 
Lower than the 
median 
3 3 6 
Greater than the 
median 
3 3 6 
Total 6 6 12 
Pearson chi-square (1) = 0.0000    P = 1.000 
Table A4: Median test on information sharing (treat-
ments 2 and 4), only basic-informed agents included 
  T2 T4 Total 
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s 
Lower than the 
median 
2 4 6 
Greater than the 
median 
4 2 6 
Total 6 6 12 
Pearson chi-square (1) = 1.3333    P = 0.248 
Table A5: Median test on information sharing (treat-
ments 2 and 4), only quasi-insiders agents included 
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Figure B1: Trade prices in Treatment 1 
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Figure B2: Trade prices in Treatment 2 
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Figure B3: Trade prices in Treatment 3 
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Figure B4: Trade prices in Treatment 4 
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Figure B5: Trade prices in the baseline condition 
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APPENDIX C 
Model C1: Tobit regression analysis for RMSE pairwise comparisons between the baseline 
condition and the other treatments. 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸_𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∙ 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 ∙ ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (i) 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸_𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ∙ 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1 ∙ ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (ii) 
Where 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 is a categorical variable that identifies each market, thus controlling for market 
effects. 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 is a trend variable capturing the time effect; it equals the period in the 
session at which a certain price was obtained. ?̅?𝑖,𝑗  is a vector of demographics and 
attitudinal variables that are averaged at market level. For a detailed description of the 
demographics and attitudinal variables, see the note to Table E1 (Appendix E) 
 
Table C1(i): Pairwise comparisons between the Uninformed price RMSE in the baseline condition 
and the Uninformed price RMSE in the other treatments 
Rmse Uninformed Price in 
Periods 1_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
Baseline 
-2.63 
(0.005) 
-4.17 
(0.000) 
-4.59 
(0.000)  
-7.72 
(0.000) 
Notes: After deriving the Tobit regression estimates, pairwise comparisons are performed through Wald 
tests over the difference between the sums of market dummy coefficients belonging to different 
treatments. From the row variable we subtract the column variable, i.e. Baseline – T1; Baseline – T2: and 
so on. 
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Table C1(ii): Pairwise comparisons between the Dividend price RMSE in the base-line condition 
and the Dividend price RMSE in the other treatments 
Rmse Dividend Price in 
Periods 1_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
Baseline 
4.11 
(0.032) 
7.89 
(0.000) 
6.88 
(0.001)  
9.00 
(0.000) 
 
Notes: After deriving the Tobit regression estimates, pairwise comparisons are performed through Wald 
tests over the difference between the sums of market dummy coefficients belonging to different 
treatments. From the row variable we subtract the column variable, i.e. Baseline – T1; Baseline – T2: and 
so on. 
 
Model C2: Tobit Regression analysis for price convergence toward the uninformed price 
and dividend price within the base-line condition 
𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∙ 𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 + ∑ 𝜃𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1
∙ ?̅?𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜃 ∙ 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑓_𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Variables are defined above. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Figure D1: RMSE Uninf. Price (1° half) 
 
Figure D2: RMSE Uninf. Price (2° half) 
 
Figure D3: RMSE Bayes Price (1° half) 
 
Figure D4: RMSE Bayes Price (2° half) 
 
Figure D5: RMSE Dividend (1° half) 
 
Figure D6: RMSE Dividend (2° half) 
  
Figure D5: RMSE Efficient Price (1° half) Figure D6: RMSE Efficient Price (2° 
half) 
0
1
2
3
4
5
First Half
RMSE Uninformed Price
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
0
1
2
3
4
5
Second Half
RMSE Uninformed Price
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
0
2
4
6
First half
RMSE Bayes Price
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
0
2
4
6
8
Second Half
RMSE Bayes Price
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
0
2
4
6
8
First half
RMSE Dividend
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
Second Half
RMSE Dividend
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
0
2
4
6
8
First half
RMSE Efficient Price
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
0
2
4
6
8
Second Half
RMSE Efficient Price
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Treatment 3 Treatment 4
 45 
APPENDIX E  
Table E1: Regression analysis of Tobit model for price convergence toward the Efficient Price 
VARIABLES Periods 1-10 Periods 11-20 Periods 1-20 
    
period -0.0988*** -0.0790** -0.0869*** 
 (0.0336) (0.0370) (0.0124) 
T1S3M1 -0.175 -0.505 -0.299 
 (0.809) (0.788) (0.560) 
T1S3M2 0.437 0.405 0.517 
 (0.739) (0.673) (0.496) 
T1S3M3 -0.341 -0.723 -0.402 
 (0.844) (0.913) (0.613) 
T1S10M1 -0.410 -0.711 -0.540 
 (1.137) (0.847) (0.690) 
T1S10M2 -1.032 -1.573* -1.194** 
 (0.848) (0.863) (0.595) 
T2S2M1 0.107 -1.295** -0.686 
 (0.659) (0.624) (0.448) 
T2S4M1 0.162 -0.954 -0.397 
 (0.727) (0.746) (0.524) 
T2S4M2 -0.852 -0.988 -0.915* 
 (0.625) (0.806) (0.517) 
T2S4M3 -0.0451 -1.067 -0.552 
 (0.730) (0.676) (0.504) 
T2S4M4 -0.196 -0.547 -0.342 
 (0.665) (0.738) (0.496) 
T2S9M1 -0.535 -0.276 -0.419 
 (0.584) (0.596) (0.409) 
T3S5M1 0.428 1.465** 0.980** 
 (0.635) (0.729) (0.494) 
T3S5M2 0.230 1.409* 0.851 
 (0.895) (0.835) (0.606) 
T3S5M3 -0.594 -0.510 -0.471 
 (0.620) (1.006) (0.600) 
T3S8M1 0.0390 -1.480* -0.660 
 (0.701) (0.760) (0.510) 
T3S8M2 0.167 -0.582 -0.215 
 (0.697) (0.642) (0.462) 
T3S8M3 -0.345 -1.821** -1.024** 
 (0.764) (0.710) (0.515) 
T4S6M1 -0.240 -2.084*** -1.183** 
 (0.791) (0.717) (0.542) 
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Table E1 contd.    
T4S6M2 0.194 -0.723 -0.294 
 (0.880) (0.899) (0.622) 
T4S6M3 -0.0595 -1.563** -0.853* 
 (0.630) (0.752) (0.492) 
T4S6M4 -0.235 -0.918 -0.535 
 (0.656) (0.728) (0.486) 
T4S7M1 0.0628 -0.923 -0.398 
 (1.003) (0.769) (0.632) 
T4S7M2 1.105 0.289 0.714 
 (0.738) (0.893) (0.575) 
age_market_mean 0.153 -0.0746 -0.00354 
 (0.112) (0.102) (0.0736) 
deg_market_mean 0.599 1.504 0.364 
 (0.948) (1.189) (0.732) 
exp_market_mean -0.352 -0.200 -0.188 
 (0.278) (0.263) (0.180) 
fin_market_mean 0.345 -0.353 0.0347 
 (0.469) (0.515) (0.332) 
fut_market_mean -0.178 -0.431 -0.368 
 (0.411) (0.452) (0.300) 
gender_market_mean -0.0452 0.219 -0.0226 
 (0.508) (0.502) (0.345) 
Constant 0.898 6.690** 5.368*** 
 (3.155) (3.004) (2.006) 
    
Observations 240 240 480 
Pseudo R2 0.0419 0.0621 0.0580 
    
Notes: The Efficient Price RMSE is the Dependent Variable. In column 1 (Periods 1-10) the model has been 
run on the first 10 periods of each market only. In column 2 (Periods 11_20) the model has been run on the 
second 10 periods block of each market only. In column 3 (Periods 1_20) the model has been run on the 
whole 20 periods of each market. Numbers in in parentheses are robust standard errors *** = p<0.01, ** = 
p<0.05, * = p<0.1. All the demographics and attitudinal variables are averaged at the market level. “Age” 
stands for the subjects’ age. “Deg: is a binary variable taking on value 1 if the subject is attending economics-
related degrees. “Exp” stands for the number of times that the subject has participated in a similar experiment. 
“Fin” captures the subject’s perception of the financial situation of his family. “Fut” indicates whether the 
subject would consider working for the financial sector in the future. “Gender” stands for female gender. 
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Table E2: Regression analysis of Tobit model for price convergence toward the Bayes Price 
VARIABLES Periods 1_10 Periods 11_20 Periods 1_20 
    
period -0.0368 -0.00252 0.00242 
 (0.0226) (0.0218) (0.00826) 
T1S3M1 -0.258 -1.404*** -0.763*** 
 (0.408) (0.301) (0.283) 
T1S3M2 -0.0813 -0.609* -0.304 
 (0.388) (0.355) (0.261) 
T1S3M3 -0.350 0.0584 -0.144 
 (0.440) (0.450) (0.302) 
T1S10M1 -0.761 -1.046*** -0.796** 
 (0.571) (0.366) (0.332) 
T1S10M2 -0.631 -0.331 -0.374 
 (0.489) (0.434) (0.312) 
T2S2M1 -0.237 0.422 0.119 
 (0.387) (0.377) (0.273) 
T2S4M1 0.189 0.997** 0.595* 
 (0.540) (0.412) (0.348) 
T2S4M2 0.401 1.544*** 0.985** 
 (0.524) (0.589) (0.416) 
T2S4M3 -0.616 1.356** 0.417 
 (0.406) (0.593) (0.404) 
T2S4M4 -1.114*** -0.215 -0.620** 
 (0.378) (0.354) (0.264) 
T2S9M1 -1.099*** -1.528*** -1.237*** 
 (0.347) (0.276) (0.210) 
T3S5M1 0.198 0.486 0.423 
 (0.385) (0.403) (0.276) 
T3S5M2 -0.0122 0.296 0.220 
 (0.584) (0.406) (0.346) 
T3S5M3 -0.0604 0.400 0.192 
 (0.422) (0.488) (0.338) 
T3S8M1 -0.808** -0.881** -0.715*** 
 (0.392) (0.411) (0.276) 
T3S8M2 -0.331 -0.780** -0.478* 
 (0.390) (0.307) (0.245) 
T3S8M3 -0.891* -0.740* -0.699** 
 (0.454) (0.380) (0.294) 
T4S6M1 -0.389 -0.149 -0.249 
 (0.378) (0.393) (0.274) 
T4S6M2 -0.236 0.114 0.0134 
 (0.454) (0.421) (0.298) 
 48 
Table E2 contd.    
T4S6M3 0.329 0.531 0.442* 
 (0.364) (0.338) (0.248) 
T4S6M4 -0.681* -0.138 -0.334 
 (0.400) (0.337) (0.253) 
T4S7M1 -0.112 -0.543 -0.223 
 (0.613) (0.349) (0.361) 
T4S7M2 0.421 0.240 0.439 
 (0.527) (0.537) (0.365) 
age_market_mean 0.0938 0.0130 0.0596 
 (0.0706) (0.0615) (0.0480) 
deg_market_mean 0.370 -0.856 -0.170 
 (0.602) (0.627) (0.417) 
exp_market_mean -0.403** -0.263 -0.265** 
 (0.200) (0.170) (0.126) 
fin_market_mean 0.213 0.119 0.132 
 (0.276) (0.286) (0.194) 
fut_market_mean -0.313 0.0487 -0.0907 
 (0.252) (0.283) (0.187) 
gender_market_mean -0.323 -0.212 -0.247 
 (0.318) (0.292) (0.227) 
Constant 1.143 3.057* 1.538 
 (1.897) (1.736) (1.301) 
    
Observations 240 240 480 
Pseudo R2 0.0734 0.162 0.0826 
Notes: The Bayes Price RMSE is the Dependent Variable. See Notes to Table E1 for variables’ definition. 
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Table E3: Regression analysis of Tobit model for price convergence toward the Uninformed 
Price 
VARIABLES Periods 1_10 Periods 11_20 Periods 1_20 
    
period 0.0472*** 0.0526*** 0.0508*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0193) (0.00665) 
T1S3M1 0.336 -0.832*** -0.276 
 (0.426) (0.235) (0.306) 
T1S3M2 0.0687 -0.116 -0.0985 
 (0.265) (0.265) (0.207) 
T1S3M3 0.836*** 0.730** 0.686*** 
 (0.274) (0.354) (0.228) 
T1S10M1 1.173*** 0.267 0.672** 
 (0.336) (0.416) (0.315) 
T1S10M2 1.010** 1.698*** 1.282*** 
 (0.412) (0.511) (0.334) 
T2S2M1 0.621** 1.582*** 1.123*** 
 (0.312) (0.342) (0.246) 
T2S4M1 0.180 1.566*** 0.846*** 
 (0.322) (0.381) (0.279) 
T2S4M2 0.230 1.507*** 0.866*** 
 (0.332) (0.314) (0.249) 
T2S4M3 0.282 1.108** 0.684** 
 (0.307) (0.428) (0.279) 
T2S4M4 -0.205 0.980** 0.388 
 (0.317) (0.383) (0.275) 
T2S9M1 -0.0160 0.486 0.158 
 (0.284) (0.323) (0.211) 
T3S5M1 0.919*** 0.204 0.480* 
 (0.279) (0.286) (0.245) 
T3S5M2 0.982*** 0.213 0.510* 
 (0.352) (0.391) (0.298) 
T3S5M3 0.755** 1.852*** 1.214*** 
 (0.298) (0.421) (0.277) 
T3S8M1 0.196 1.574*** 0.839*** 
 (0.236) (0.388) (0.262) 
T3S8M2 0.471** 0.842*** 0.649*** 
 (0.237) (0.249) (0.185) 
T3S8M3 0.917*** 2.138*** 1.507*** 
 (0.269) (0.322) (0.248) 
T4S6M1 1.335*** 2.092*** 1.685*** 
 (0.332) (0.394) (0.268) 
T4S6M2 1.001*** 1.882*** 1.372*** 
 (0.229) (0.357) (0.226) 
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T4S6M3 1.571*** 2.541*** 2.058*** 
 (0.263) (0.228) (0.194) 
T4S6M4 0.488 2.015*** 1.197*** 
 (0.307) (0.306) (0.256) 
T4S7M1 1.110*** 1.000*** 1.047*** 
 (0.386) (0.372) (0.284) 
T4S7M2 1.209*** 1.504*** 1.274*** 
 (0.244) (0.371) (0.218) 
age_market_mean 0.00693 0.0325 0.0446 
 (0.0503) (0.0598) (0.0404) 
deg_market_mean 0.648** 0.950*** 0.881*** 
 (0.300) (0.351) (0.262) 
exp_market_mean 0.228** 0.182 0.171* 
 (0.110) (0.142) (0.0981) 
fin_market_mean 0.215 0.278 0.165 
 (0.172) (0.231) (0.148) 
fut_market_mean 0.283 0.158 0.307* 
 (0.177) (0.262) (0.163) 
gender_market_mean -0.387* -0.261 -0.202 
 (0.214) (0.283) (0.193) 
Constant -0.397 -1.637 -1.605* 
 (1.167) (1.483) (0.940) 
    
Observations 270 270 540 
Pseudo R2 0.194 0.241 0.177 
Notes: The Uninformed Price RMSE is the Dependent Variable. See Notes to Table E1 for variables’ 
definition. 
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Table E4: Regression analysis of Tobit model for price convergence toward the Dividend Price 
VARIABLES Periods 1_10 Periods 11_20 Periods 1_20 
    
period -0.0691** -0.0655* -0.0728*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0357) (0.0118) 
T1S3M1 -0.00707 -0.396 -0.117 
 (0.777) (0.515) (0.478) 
T1S3M2 0.434 -0.903* -0.129 
 (0.549) (0.460) (0.362) 
T1S3M3 -0.413 -1.469* -0.893 
 (0.794) (0.816) (0.579) 
T1S10M1 -0.789 -1.371* -1.116* 
 (0.869) (0.721) (0.586) 
T1S10M2 -1.510** -2.065** -1.756*** 
 (0.639) (1.023) (0.623) 
T2S2M1 -0.665 -2.528*** -1.652*** 
 (0.533) (0.565) (0.402) 
T2S4M1 -0.157 -2.226*** -1.216** 
 (0.614) (0.689) (0.488) 
T2S4M2 -1.231** -1.861** -1.605*** 
 (0.528) (0.883) (0.532) 
T2S4M3 -0.538 -1.953** -1.277** 
 (0.574) (0.779) (0.496) 
T2S4M4 -0.707 -1.937*** -1.311*** 
 (0.451) (0.647) (0.409) 
T2S9M1 -0.374 -1.127* -0.763* 
 (0.504) (0.605) (0.406) 
T3S5M1 -0.564 0.00251 -0.152 
 (0.496) (0.554) (0.406) 
T3S5M2 -0.625 -0.0954 -0.310 
 (0.814) (0.690) (0.540) 
T3S5M3 -1.084* -1.802* -1.354** 
 (0.586) (0.927) (0.562) 
T3S8M1 -0.651 -2.906*** -1.693*** 
 (0.432) (0.626) (0.395) 
T3S8M2 -0.589 -2.075*** -1.358*** 
 (0.487) (0.502) (0.362) 
T3S8M3 -1.130** -3.409*** -2.218*** 
 (0.518) (0.517) (0.383) 
T4S6M1 -1.191** -3.401*** -2.280*** 
 (0.574) (0.557) (0.427) 
T4S6M2 -0.643 -2.192*** -1.422*** 
 (0.580) (0.749) (0.484) 
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T4S6M3 -0.951** -3.004*** -1.991*** 
 (0.396) (0.643) (0.398) 
T4S6M4 -1.032** -2.364*** -1.684*** 
 (0.460) (0.587) (0.383) 
T4S7M1 -0.600 -2.494*** -1.557*** 
 (0.814) (0.653) (0.550) 
T4S7M2 0.197 -1.264* -0.459 
 (0.581) (0.755) (0.481) 
age_market_mean 0.153 -0.132 -0.0195 
 (0.101) (0.103) (0.0709) 
deg_market_mean -0.113 0.460 0.0887 
 (0.621) (0.648) (0.472) 
exp_market_mean -0.273 -0.299 -0.217 
 (0.236) (0.248) (0.172) 
fin_market_mean 0.326 -0.179 0.104 
 (0.397) (0.437) (0.288) 
fut_market_mean -0.217 -0.527 -0.378 
 (0.374) (0.431) (0.287) 
gender_market_mean 0.288 0.201 0.0636 
 (0.421) (0.480) (0.325) 
Constant 2.011 10.08*** 6.809*** 
 (2.341) (2.445) (1.642) 
    
Observations 270 270 540 
Pseudo R2 0.0491 0.0806 0.0640 
Notes: The Dividend Price RMSE is the Dependent Variable. See Notes to Table E1 for variables’ definition. 
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Wald tests over the difference between the sums of market dummy coefficients belonging to 
different treatments. In order to test for the null hypothesis of absence of differences between 
two treatments, we consider: 
𝐻0: 𝑍𝑟,𝑠 ≡ ∑ βi,r
𝑛𝑟
i=1
− ∑ βi,s
𝑛𝑠
i=1
= 0 
where r and s identify the markets associated with two different treatments. 𝑛𝑟  and 𝑛𝑠 are the 
numbers of markets belonging to treatment r and s. Our design includes six markets for each 
treatment. 𝑛𝑟  and 𝑛𝑠 are therefore always equal to six, except for the treatment to which the 
omitted category of the model belongs (Treatment 1). Note that the possibility that 𝑛𝑟 > 𝑛𝑠 
for comparisons involving Treatment 1 does not affect the estimation of our pairwise 
comparisons, since the omitted category coefficient is implicitly zero. With reference to each 
pairwise comparison, tables from F1 to F12 report the statistics 𝑍𝑟,𝑠  as well as the related p-
value in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). In particular, each pairwise comparison has 
to be read subtracting the column variable from the row variable, e.g. T1 – T2, T1 – T3, T1 – 
T4, T2 – T3, and so on. 
Table F1: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Efficient Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 10 
Rmse Efficient Price in Periods 1_10 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
-0.16 
(0.938) 
-1.44 
(0.444)  
-2.34 
(0.238)  
T2   
-1.28 
(0.446) 
-2.18 
(0.292) 
T3    
-0.90 
(0.617) 
T4     
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Table F2: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Efficient Price across treatments in periods from 11 to 20 
Rmse Efficient Price in Periods 11_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
2.02 
(0.300) 
-1.58 
(0.384)  
2.81 
(0.136)  
T2   
-3.60* 
(0.068) 
0.79 
(0.710) 
T3    
4.40** 
(0.014) 
T4     
 
 
 
Table F3: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Efficient Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 20 
Rmse Efficient Price in Periods 1_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
1.39 
(0.327) 
-1.37 
(0.296)  
0.63 
(0.647)  
T2   
-2.77** 
(0.031) 
-0.76 
(0.613) 
T3    
2.01 
(0.120) 
T4     
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Table F4: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Bayes Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 10 
Rmse Bayes Price in Periods 1_10 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
0.39 
(0.771) 
-0.17 
(0.871)  
-1.41 
(0.199)  
T2   
-0.57 
(0.671) 
-1.80 
(0.200) 
T3    
-1.23 
(0.292) 
T4     
 
 
 
 
Table F5: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Bayes Price across treatments in periods from 11 to 20 
Rmse Bayes Price in Periods 11_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
-5.90*** 
(0.000) 
-2.11** 
(0.023)  
-3.38*** 
(0.000)  
T2   
3.79*** 
(0.002) 
2.52* 
(0.057) 
T3    
-1.27 
(0.192) 
T4     
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Table F6: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Bayes Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 20 
Rmse Bayes Price in Periods 1_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
-2.63*** 
(0.005) 
-1.32* 
(0.073) 
-2.47*** 
(0.001)  
T2   
1.31 
(0.162) 
0.16 
(0.867) 
T3    
-1.14 
(0.138) 
T4     
 
 
 
 
Table F7: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Uninformed Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 10 
Rmse Uninformed Price in Periods 1_10 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
3.07*** 
(0.001) 
0.06 
(0.939)  
-2.17** 
(0.013)  
T2   
-3.14*** 
(0.000) 
-5.62*** 
(0.000) 
T3    
2.47*** 
(0.002) 
T4     
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Table F8: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Uninformed Price across treatments in periods from 11 to 20 
Rmse Uninformed Price in Periods 11_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
-4.93*** 
(0.000) 
-3.89*** 
(0.000) 
-8.29*** 
(0.000)  
T2   
0.40 
(0.717) 
-3.80*** 
(0.001) 
T3    
-4.21*** 
(0.000) 
T4     
 
 
 
Table F9: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Uninformed Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 20 
Rmse Uninformed Price in Periods 1_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
-1.10 
(0.168) 
-1.96** 
(0.011)  
-5.39*** 
(0.000) 
T2   
-1.13 
(0.138) 
-4.56*** 
(0.000) 
T3    
-3.43*** 
(0.000) 
T4     
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Table F10: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Dividend Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 10 
Rmse Dividend Price in Periods 1_10 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
1.11 
(0.572) 
2.08 
(0.277) 
1.70 
(0.387)  
T2   
0.97 
(0.545) 
0.54 
(0.768) 
T3    
-0.42 
(0.808) 
T4     
 
 
 
Table F11: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Dividend Price across treatments in periods from 11 to 20 
Rmse Dividend Price in Periods 11_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
5.21** 
(0.020) 
3.56* 
(0.081)  
8.33*** 
(0.000) 
T2   
-1.34 
(0.522) 
3.08 
(0.172) 
T3    
4.43** 
(0.015) 
T4     
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Table F12: Pairwise comparisons of Rmse Dividend Price across treatments in periods from 1 to 20 
Rmse Dividend Price in Periods 1_20 
T1 T2 T3 T4 
T1  
3.57** 
(0.019) 
2.79* 
(0.052) 
5.26*** 
(0.000)  
T2   
-0.73 
(0.577) 
1.56 
(0.299) 
T3    
2.30* 
(0.075) 
T4     
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APPENDIX G 
Instructions Text (Translated from Spanish) 
Welcome. We are undertaking a research project about decision making in asset 
markets. Your gains will be personally communicated and paid to you at the end of this 
session. Your personal data will be treated confidentially and they will not be given any 
use different from the present research project. Your name will never be associated 
with your decisions. Communication with other participants will result in the 
immediate exclusion from the experiment for those breaking the rule. 
At the beginning of the session you will be randomly assigned to a marked formed 
by 12 people. You will remain in the same market the whole of the session. However, 
the identity of the participants in each market will be unknown to all of you. 
The currency used in the asset market will be the Experimental Unit (EU), so that 
prices, gains, etc., will be expressed in EUs. At the end of the session, the EUs that you 
have accumulated will be converted into Euro using the following exchange rate 50 EU 
= 1 Euro. Remember that the more EU you earn, the more Euro you will take home. 
 
Part I: The Asset Market 
 
There will be 20 trading periods of two minutes each. 
At the beginning of each period your initial portfolio will consist of 10 shares and 
1000 EU in cash. Each participant has the same initial portfolio. All shares of all 
participants in a market are equal and they pay the same dividend in each given period. 
Each period, the dividend can be either 10 EU per share or 0 EU per share, with 
50% probability. Our program makes a draw at the beginning of each period in order 
to determine whether the dividend will be 0 or 10 at the end of that period. The exact 
value of the dividend will be announced at the end of each period. 
You can buy and sell as many shares as you wish, as long as you have not 
exhausted all your cash or the number of shares you possess, respectively. Each bid or 
ask which finds a counterpart implies the exchange of a single share. The remaining 
orders of the same sign that you have made to the market will be automatically erased 
when you succeed in exchanging one share. So, you will have to introduce new orders 
if you want to continue trading.    
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Your Gains 
Your gains at the end of each period are equal to: 
   + EU received for the shares you sold in the period 
   - EU paid for the shares you bought in the period 
   + final dividend of the period times the number of shares that you possess 
Please note that total cash in your account does not enter this calculation. 
At the beginning of each period you will get a new 10 shares and 1000 EU in cash, 
independently of what happened in previous periods. 
Hence, your total accumulated gains will be equal to the sum of your gains in each 
single period. You will get this information on your screen at the end of each period. 
If, at any moment, you have any kind of doubt or problem do not hesitate to 
address a member of the lab. Remember that it is important that you understand the 
functioning of the market, given that your gains depend both on your decisions and on 
those of the other participants in your market. 
Now we will analyse in detail how the market functions. We will illustrate first 
how you can buy and sell shares using the trading screen. Then we will run three trial 
periods for you to get familiar with the market. These 3 periods will not be paid to you 
at the end of the session. 
 
Part II: Informative signals 
 
As already mentioned, the dividend will be either 10 EU per share or 0 EU with 
50% probability. At the end of the session you can, if you wish, check how our program 
makes the random draws. Now we will explain an important feature of the asset market 
in which you are about to participate. 
At the beginning of each period, before trading initiates, you will get information 
about the value of the dividend that each share in your portfolio will pay at the end of 
the same period. Each informative signal will tell you whether the expected dividend is 
10 EU or 0 EU. However, these signals are uncertain, they will be telling you the truth 
in 70% of the cases. 
The received signals are private and each participant in the market gets 
independent and potentially different signals. 
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Part III: Revealing information (Treatment 2) 
 
At the beginning of the session you have been randomly assigned to a group 
formed by a total of 3 people. 
There are two types of groups: in type A groups each agent will receive only one 
informative signal at the beginning of the period. In type B groups each agent will 
receive three informative signals at the beginning of the period. 
In your market of 12 participants, there will be 3 type A groups and just one type 
B group. The probabilities of being assigned to each of the groups are the same for each 
participant. The members of your group will be kept constant through the periods. Also 
the type of group to which you belong will be kept constant. 
At the beginning of each period, after receiving your personal informative signals 
about the true value of the dividend, you will have the possibility to reveal your 
information to the other two members of your group. Simultaneously, each one of them 
can also decide to reveal his information to the other group members. 
Before the asset market starts, in the upper part of the screen you will be able to 
see all the signals you have after the information reception and revelation process has 
taken place within your group. You can use the information you have available in order 
to decide your market strategy. 
Example from a type A group participant: 
 
Example from a type B group participant: 
 
In the screens above you can see your received signals, and how you can decide 
whether to reveal your signals to the other members of your group. 
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Trading screen from a type A group participant: 
 
Trading screen from a type B group participant: 
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At the end of each period you will be shown your individual gains in the last 
period, and your accumulated gains, also the average gains in your group, the average 
gains in your market and the average gains of the members of the type B group. 
 
 
